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Georg Cantor was the genuine discoverer of the Mathematical In-
finity, and whatever he claimed, suggested, or even surmised should
be taken seriously – albeit not necessary at its face value. Because
alongside his exquisite in beauty ordinal construction and his funda-
mental powerset description of the continuum, Cantor has also left
to us his obsessive presumption that the universe of sets should be
subjected to laws similar to those governing the set of natural num-
bers, including the universal principles of cardinal comparability and
well-ordering – and implying an ordinal re-creation of the continuum.
During the last hundred years, the mainstream set-theoretical research
– all insights and adjustments due to Kurt Gödel’s revolutionary in-
sights and discoveries notwithstanding – has compliantly centered its
efforts on ad hoc axiomatizations of Cantor’s intuitive transfinite de-
sign. We demonstrate here that the ontological and epistemic sus-
tainability of this design has been irremediably compromised by the
underlying peremptory, Reductionist mindset of the XIXth century’s
ideology of science. Our analysis and prompted by it synthesis lead to:
(i) the extension of the well-known two-terms foundational opposition
CN : {existence by axiomatic consistency ⇒ notational existence},
to its novel, four-term axiomatic viability criterion RSCN :
{ontological relevancy ⇒ onto− epistemic sustainability ⇔ CN},
reducing ZF and its extentsions to the status of interactive program-
ming languages manipulating ad hoc contrived, pure notational infinite
totalities, (ii) the new ontological insights into “the nature” of the con-
tinuum inspired by the quantum-mechanical entanglement argument,
and (iii) the interpretation of Cantor’s class of all countable ordinals
ω1 as an authentic, universal, ever emerging and never completed ordi-
nal scale of the power and sophistication of iterative logical arguments.
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I was beside the Master craftsman,
delighting him day after day,
ever at play in his presence,
at play everywhere on his earth,
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1 Introduction
1.1 Cantor’s Mission and His Peremptory Amalgams
Georg Ferdinand Ludwig Philipp Cantor, 1835-1918, the genuine discoverer
and the first forceful colonizer of the Mathematical Infinity’s mountain range,
was not just a scientist and mathematician: the powerful thinker of a strong
spiritual bent, he was a missionary – or, at least, so was he himself perceiving
his scientific vocation, systematically pursuing it as the mission to shed a new
intellectual and, hopefully, spiritual light into the mystery of the Infinite.
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It has never been easy to be a missionary, and as many other missionaries
before and after him, Georg Cantor has fallen victim to the most sustained
and cruel persecution – in his case, academic. The rejection and the ridicule
were so unforgiving – especially, on the part of Leopold Kronecker, his el-
der and highly regarded colleague, the editor of the most prestigious Ger-
man Mathematical magazine who “considered Cantor a scientific charlatan,
a renegade, a ‘corrupter of youth’ ” [14] (p. 1) – that Cantor’s mental health
has greatly suffered. He died in the mental institution unaware of the long
overdue recognition his work finally received, in particular, from the London
Mathematical Society.
There is no doubt that, alongside Cantor’s health, the intellectual free-
dom, transparency, integrity, semantical relevancy and, ultimately, the on-
tological and epistemic sustainability of his scientific quest suffered as well.
Most tragically, Cantor himself has been fully aware of this:
“But despite the seeming thoroughness of it all, the special results of trans-
finite arithmetic did not compensate for the major flaw in Cantor’s entire
presentation [of his results in the major seminal paper of 1897 – EB]. The
continuum hypothesis remained unresolved, as did the questions of whether
every transfinite power was an aleph, whether the transfinite cardinals were all
comparable, and whether every set could actually be well-ordered. Through-
out the entire presentation, in fact, there was a nagging sense that something
was not quite right.” ([14], p. 194)
Was it the psychological hardship aggravating the usual professional pres-
sure to deliver the new ideas and results as fast and as strong as possible, or
just the excitement to discover the new and infinite “terra incognita”, with
its exquisite in beauty ordinal construction and its fundamental powerset
description of the continuum?
Whatever might be the reasons, the inescapable fact is that Georg Cantor
has obsessively precipitated and stoically maintained the imposition of his
original, overbearing global transfinite design, marked from our point of view
by a grave ontological insufficiency, epistemic arbitrariness and driven by his
Reductionist methodological presumptions, as follows:
First, sets should be subjected to laws similar to those governing the
set of natural numbers, including the universal principles of cardinal compa-
rability and well-ordering implying ultimately an ordinal re-creation of the
continuum. This minor, suggestive, and relatively benign type of Cantor’s
reductionism, with a lowercase “r ”, has been exposed and analyzed on sev-
eral occasions (cf., e.g., Michael Hallett’s [28]), albeit without any remedies
proposed.
Second, the Universe of sets, or the Absolute, exists in the sense that
is available to us as a whole for manipulation and, eventually, total formal
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control.
This last, absolute type of Cantor’s reductionism should not be confused
with his or Gödelian or, for that matter, Finslerian Platonism which is in
principle compatible with an open, emerging universe of ideas about sets.
Rather this militant Reductionism, forcefully imposing its pre-conceived, on-
tologically rigid and epistemicly arbitrary designs on the laws of the domain
one is supposed to discover and not to invent, was the product of the ideo-
logically uniform, peremptory mindset of the XIXth century’s philosophy of
science (cf. Section 4.4).
The result, as we see it, is most dispiriting: during the last hundred
years, the mainstream set-theoretical research, all insights and adjustments
due to Kurt Gödel’s revolutionary discoveries and insights notwithstanding,
has compliantly and without great success centered its efforts on ad hoc
axiomatizations of Cantor’s transfinite blueprint – from Zermelo-Frenkel’s
Axiomatics to Axioms of Large Cardinals.
And yet, all such hindsight, backward reproaches notwithstanding, it is
with the greatest delight and most sincere gratitude that we acknowledge here
the importance for the present study of Georg Cantor’s original optimistic
phenomenological and ontological vision of the Mathematical Infinity. – The
vision intellectually most penetrating and epistemicly both most general from
a mathematical practitioner’s point of view and most generous from the
point of view of a logician and a philosopher, has been one of the principal
inspirations of the present study (Section 7.1).
Our analysis and prompted by it synthesis will result in:
(i) The extension of the well-known two-terms “Platonic⇒ formal ” foun-
dational opposition
CN : {existence by axiomatic consistency ⇒ notational existence},
to its novel, four-term axiomatic viability criterion (Sections 2.3, 4.2)
RSCN : ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemological sustainability ⇔ CN},
reducing ZF and its extentsions to the status of interactive programming
languages manipulating ad hoc contrived, pure notational infinite totalities
(Section 4.5).
(ii) The new ontological insights into “the nature” of the continuum – the
insights inspired by the quantum-mechanical entanglement argument (Sec-
tion 4.5).
(iii) The interpretation of Cantor’s class of all countable ordinals ω1 as
an authentic, universal, ever emerging and never completed ordinal scale of
the power and sophistication of iterative logical arguments (Section 3.1).
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1.2 Objectives and Results
Thus, one of the most important conclusions of our analysis will be the
disavowal of Cantor’s definition of the first uncountable ordinal ω1 – the
ordinal of the well-ordered set of all countable ordinals – and the cardinal
ℵ1 associated with it as a sheer notational gimmick void of any uncountable
ontological substance – even if as such certainly helpful in notational designs
of some “very large” countable ordinals [50].
To some degree, our argument here will parallel that of the non-existence
of the ordinal of all ordinals, famous because of its role in the foundational
crisis in the beginning of the XXth century, and is inspired by the modern
research on large countable ordinals [47], with its systematic extension of our
“iterative upward mobility” when searching for definitions of new, ever more
“fast growing” countable ordinals – leading to our interpretation of Cantor’s
collection, or class, ω1 of all countable ordinals as the ever emerging ordinal
measure scale of the iterative power and sophistication of our formal logical
endeavors (cf. Section 3.1).
Deprived of its first uncountable ordinal, Cantor’s ordinal theory of the
continuum fails, with his Continuum Hypothesis retaining only its original,
naif, non-ordinal interpretation (cf. Section 2.5).
Consequently, we are faced with the challenge to look for new, non-
Cantorian ontological insights into “the nature” of the continuum – the in-
sights which could be eventually formalized by new set-theoretical axioms
(cf. Section 6).
Ours will be a still informal but far-reaching extension of the entangle-
ment argument borrowed from quantum theory and the theory of quantum
computation[46] (cf. Section 6.1).
Armed with these novel transfinite insights and arguments, we abandon
here for good both the framework of the classical set-theoretical reasoning
firmly rooted, all protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, in the XIXth
century’s reductionist paradigm of mechanistic causality and the closely re-
lated to it – in fact, implicitly underlying, even if postdating it – classical
theory of computation, formalized by Alfonso Church and Alan Turing (cf.
Section 6.1).
It is this theory which, in the absence of any formal alternative of a
comparable importance, is deemed today by many to somehow stand for
the theory of human thinking, with Cantor’s aforementioned “fundamental
law of thought” being a clear tributary to such a reductionist, outdated,
but still beguiling philosophical appeal. Emboldened by our new insights
into the Transfinite, we will conclude the present study by a discussion of
an alternative approach to the essentially non-algorithmic, extemporaneous,
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creative human thinking (cf. Section 7.4).
Some of our novel ontological and epistemic insights and suggestions are
easily lending itself to appropriate formalizations in the today universally
accepted Zermelo-Frenkel’s set-theoretical framework suitably adjusted to
our needs.
This is the case of our understanding of the nature of Cantor’s first un-
countable “ordinal” ω1: its immediate formal definitions (cf. the notations in
Section 3.1)
ω1 = {α ∈ On | α is countable} =
⋃
α is a countable ordinal
α
are either involving the General Comprehension Scheme with the condition
countable which, as we claim, is not even definite (cf., e.g.,[45], p. 20) because
involving the verification by counting to the infinite, or appealing to Zermelo’s
Fixed Point Theorem ([45], p. 73) coming at the heels of his well-ordering
theorem which, in its turn, needs the full power of the Powerset Axiom and,
for the sake of a formal justification of Cantor’s construction of ω1, proves in
our case too much to make this construction credible.
Other conceptual novelties of this study need new instruments of formal-
ization which are at hand, too. Two particular tracks of such an eventual
formalization are followed in our forthcoming papers [8], [9].
We feel, however, that the full axiomatization of our blueprint of the
Mathematical Infinity should be the subject of a separate presentation. This
is why all formal aspects of our study are kept here to a minimum – in con-
sequence making eventually our paper accessible to a general mathematical
reader.
1.3 Bibliographical Note and Acknowledgments
The historical remarks let drop above and below do not represent a history
of either Cantor’s discoveries, or its antecedents and sequels. Our choice
is restricted to a few important for what follows conceptual breakthroughs
whether, in our opinion, they are fully, or only partially, or not at all justified
by the further developments [7].
The interested reader could find mutually complementing accounts of the
emergence and development of pre-Cantorian, Cantorian, and post-Cantorian
Set Theories in the following papers and monographs listed according to the
alphabetical order of their authors to whom the present author expresses his
most sincere gratitude: Joseph Warren Dauben [14], Solomon Feferman [18],
Michael Hallett [28], Thomas Jech [33], Akihiro Kanamori [35], Penelope
Maddy [41], and Gregory H. Moore [44].
7
Author expresses his profound gratitude to these authors
2 Epistemic Prequel to the Advent of Ordinals:
Plain Continuum Standing Alone and High
2.1 Prelude
It was originally the usually overlooked or intentionally ignored scandal of
the undervaluation of the importance of the continuum, compared to that of
Cantor’s ordinal invention, as a priceless ontological source of the intuition
into the Infinite that has struck a raw nerve with the author [4], [6] and
ultimately prompted the present conceptual revision.
The epistemic and methodological roots of such a gross distortion, as
well as the general historical and cultural predispositions to it are eluci-
dated below, Sections 2.4, 2.5, as a prelude to our original approach to the
foundational challenge posed by Mathematical Infinity – the challenge whose
meaning and importance were buried under the debris of diverse axiomatic
and technical accommodations of Cantor’s primeval transfinite design.
This is why, in the present chapter, we have chosen first to revise in a
free, leisurely, and informal way some basic and vital concepts and ontological
insights concerning the continuum, the concepts and insights coming both
from Greeks and modern mathematics, but mostly forgotten, ignored, or
hastily and uncritically absorbed by the Cantorian and post-Cantorian set
theories – if not irremediably crushed under the weight of their ever growing
transfinite tower, with “its top eventually reaching heaven”.
We accompany these revisions by informal and indicative for what follows
hints of our principal insights, motivations, expectations – briefly, of the
driving intuitions behind the present study.
2.2 Antiquity: an Infinity Flashback
Heraclitus is the one who first
declared the nature of the infinite
and first grasped nature as in itself
infinite, that is, its essence as process.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie
Before Georg Cantor has entered the scene of mathematical infinity, two
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types of infinite totalities – the countable and the continuum, both re-
discovered and radically re-mastered by Cantor – were already well known
“experimentally” to the mainstream Western mathematical and philosophical
communities, starting with those of Ancient Greece.
In fact, the Greeks have been the first to discover and “colonize” two basic
infinite mathematical habitats, the set of natural numbers denoted today
N, or (Cantor’s notations) ω or ω0, and the real line continuum R which
have remained ever since both the most fundamental and widely used by
modern practitioners of Mathematics, of Computer Science, and of Sciences
at large, with their “infinite sizes”, or powers, according to Cantor, denoted
respectively
∣∣ ω ∣∣=∣∣ ω0 ∣∣= ℵ0 and ∣∣ R ∣∣= c.
These habitats existed for the Greeks as they exist for us, present-day
mathematical yokels, independently of any formal or axiomatic justifications,
but simply because they represent the indispensable, intuitively clear, and
intellectually reliable mediums for beautiful mathematical theories rich in
fruitful applications:
“Among mathematicians, there is a widespread view that ongoing current
mathematics on the whole is more reliable than any of the philosophically
motivated programs that have been proposed to replace it, and that the only
foundations that need be considered (if any at all) is organizational.” [20]
Being well acquainted experimentally and fully comfortable theoretically
with two basic numerical and geometric universes N and R, the Greeks were
fully conscious of the ontological differences between these two infinities, as
is abundantly clear from the famous paradoxes advanced by Zeno of Elea
(ca. 490 BC – ca. 430 BC) ([12] p. 26; [2] pp. 54-57).
In particular, Zeno’s paradox “Achilles and the Tortoise” clearly demon-
strates the perceived by its author conceptual incompatibility between two
different types of human experiences: the external, existential on the one
hand and the inner, intellectual, and in particular mathematical, on the
other hand – the experiences nurturing two different concepts of infinity.
The first type, associated today with the continuum concept, emerges
from our observations of the external world viewed as an infinite and contin-
uous one- or more-dimensional flow: the ever-changing skies, the waters of a
river, the flight of an arrow, a running athlete, et cetera.
The second type, taking its origins in the human intellectual activity, is
best encapsulated by all sorts of the counting experience – through obser-
vations of heart-beatings, walking as a step-by-step movement, building of
towers, etc. – and represents the only humanly available and never-ending
“accumulation of infinity” by finite and discrete portions – and so on.
Zeno, like Heraclitus before him, clearly doubted that the two infinities
could be reconciled: one can run, but one cannot adequately understand or
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otherwise fully and exhaustively capture in a purely intellectual way, and
in particular formally, this phenomenon, because our reasoning proceeds by
finite and discrete steps, by discrete markers or buoys occasionally dropped
in the moving waters, whereas our and the river movement – a mystery in
itself – is, as an ever-changing face of a river, continuous:
“On those stepping into the same river, other and other waters flow (Her-
aclitus of Ephesus, ca. 535 – ca 475 BC)
One should not be surprised to discover that Zeno’s paradoxes remain of
interest to modern philosophers as well. Thus, for instance, Henri Bergson
(1859-1941) is thoroughly discussing and forcefully “explaining” them anew
in his book [10] (pp. 1259, 1376, 1377).
Making the Point 1 : Austere Ontological Realism and Epistemic
Discretion of the Greeks. Heraclitus’ and Zeno’s visions are far from
being Platonic. In their austere and minimalist epistemic way, they do not
suppose the existence of an independently and objectively existing “idea” of
the reality flow, the idea which could be somehow and somewhen adequately
and definitively captured by philosophical or mathematical formalizations. In-
stead, in the spirit of their austere ontological realism, they expect us to live
in the presence of this flow – the flow thought of as an ever ongoing, fully
external to us, independent of us, and most rich phenomenologically process.
The process to be patiently observed, experimented with, etc. – with the ex-
pectation that we will be able with time to acquire new intellectual insights
and intuitions somehow “explaining” this process, the intuitions susceptible
to be eventually theorized and formalized.
2.3 From Formal to Platonic Existence, and Beyond.
It is clear that neither Georg Cantor, nor Kurt Gödel, nor for that matter,
Paul Finsler quoted below have shared such an extreme epistemic discretion
and ontological “price sensitivity” – choosing instead the Platonic vision of
mathematical abstractions as objectively existing, directly accessible to us
“theoretical realities”, without being initially inspired by prolonged and care-
ful existential observations and experimental considerations, to be ultimately
“distilled” from them as it were as pure abstract concepts and relationships:
“Finsler’s attitude towards mathematics was Platonistic in a very definite
sense: he believed in the reality of pure concepts. Together they form the
purely conceptual realm which encompasses all mathematical objects, struc-
tures and patterns. ... Mathematicians do not invent or construct their
structures and propositions, they recognize, or discover, how these objects
in the conceptual realm are interrelated with each other. It is clear that if
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there exists a conceptual realm, then it must be absolutely consistent; hence
existence implies consistence. ... The Platonistic perspective
of mathematics can be expressed by the converse implication: Consistency
implies existence. If a concept has been found to be consistent, it can be
assumed to exist. This means that one can find properties and prove theorems
about it.” ([21], p. 3)
Now comes the Formalist. Scarred by logical paradoxes which no Platonic
force could exorcise, he is concerned only with the correct formal, notational
existence and, respectively, formal deductibility of formal statements not
leading ultimately to the contradiction 0 = 1. According to David Hilbert’s
axiomatic manifesto, axioms are not taken as self-evident truths: the elemen-
tary notions, such as point, line, plane, and others, could be substituted by
tables, chairs, glasses of beer, etc. It is their defined relationships that only
matter and are discussed.
Or, as Abraham Robinson puts in the the infinity context which is here
of main interest to us:
“My position concerning the foundations of Mathematics is based on the
following two main points or principles. (i) Infinite totalities do not exist
in any sense of the word (i.e., either really or ideally). More precisely, any
mention, or purported mention, of infinite totalities is, literally, meaningless .
(ii) Nevertheless, we should continue the business of Mathematics ‘as usual’,
i. e., we should act as if infinite totalities really existed.” ([49], p. 230)
Robinson’s “above the brawl ” statement of the limited formalist liability
for any “infinity risks” undertaken by Mathematician both resembles and
starkly contrasts with the infinity concept of Aristotle, which in its realistic,
“hands-on” approach surpasses in our opinion even the Platonic readiness to
engage into the mathematical infinity combat.
The following statement from Aristotle’s Physics (Phys. III, 7, 207b27-34;
the translation is borrowed from [31], p. 201), anticipates the modern “ultra-
intuitionistic criticism” of, say, Alexander Yessenin-Volpin [63] and explicitly
raises the problem of the philosophical causality principles universally but
implicitly underlying our mathematical queries (cf. below Section 6.1):
“Our account does not rob the mathematicians of their study, by disprov-
ing the actual existence of the infinite ... In point of fact they do not need
the infinite and do not use it. They postulate only that the finite straight line
may be produced as far as they wish. It is possible to have divided in the same
ration as the largest quantity another magnitude of any size you like. Hence,
for the purposes of proof, it will make no difference to them to have such an
infinite instead, while its existence will be in the sphere of real magnitudes.”
As a matter of fact, it was Georg Cantor who has definitely demonstrated
that mathematicians do need the infinite and they do use it (cf., e.g., Sec-
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tion 3.1), notwithstanding the occasional expressions of doubt coming from
our contemporaries – from approvingly confident (“Infinity in Mathemat-
ics: Is Cantor Necessary ? ” [18]) to panicky deserting (Abraham Robinson
quoted above).
The point is what do we need it for, how do we use it, and what might be
the best workable and adequate philosophical and mathematical account of it :
Making the Point 2 : Extending the Platonic-Notational Interplay
into the Reality Context.
(1) We express the interplay between Platonic and formal (notational)
existence by the epistemic implication
CN : {existence by axiomatic consistency ⇒ notational existence},
(2) It goes without saying that we do not deny, neither are we dismis-
sive of, nor condescending to Platonic and formal mathematical deduction
“games” which respect only one limitation and criterion of existence: the con-
sistency of their ever extending axiomatic systems. Rather are we concerned
here with another, and for that matter, crucial for us question: how far away
and astray from the initial, fundamental aspirations and insights of our query
into the infinity – and ultimately, in what sort of a barren wilderness with no
return – are such games presently leading us [5], [6], Section 4.5.
(3) As Greeks before us, the majority of modern mathematicians could not
be satisfied with the exclusivity of the epistemic implication CN pretending to
dismiss as mathematically irrelevant or to ignore altogether the Ontological
Relevancy, the source and, through the Ontological and Epistemic Sustain-
ability link, the final judge of the Reasonableness, i.e., Verifiable Explicative
Strength of object-oriented – in this particular case, Continuum oriented –
mathematical theories.
(4) Hence our four-term “reality” extension of the above epistemic impli-
cation CN (cf. also Section 4.2):
RSCN : {ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemic sustainability ⇔ CN}.
2.4 Putting the Epistemic and Procedural Price Tags
on the Cantorian Powerset Abstraction
Georg Cantor has resolved (1874) one particular aspect of Zeno’s “Achilles
and the Tortoise” paradox, formally confirming Zeno’s intuition, by introduc-
ing the method of one-to-one correspondence, or bijection, to both identify
infinite totalities of the same power, or equipotent totalities, and to establish
12
which of two totalities is bigger. With this came his first, “topological” proof
that the set of reals is uncountable.
Another one of Cantor’s ingenious and powerful methods, that of diag-
onalization (1891), has permitted him to prove even in a more direct and
convincing way that the continuum has the power strictly bigger than that
of a countable totality, c > ℵ0.
Finally, Cantor has identified an operation (1891) acting on sequences
of natural numbers, which “re-creates” the continuum from the totality of
sub-totalities of the enumerable set N of natural numbers. In the finite case,
the similar operation applied to a set with n elements produces a set with
2n elements – hence the term the powerset construction, P , the one-to-one
correspondents P(N) ∼= R, and the equality 2ℵ0 = c.
Could all these original concepts of Cantor be understood by Greek
philosophers and mathematicians? And would they agree that Cantor’s
powerset construction P(N) ∼= R somehow invalidates Zeno’s claim of the
incompatibility of our two sources of intuition of the Mathematical Infinity,
continuous and discrete?
At any rate, it is clear that any relevant explanatory argument addressed
to the Greeks should be adapted to their austere procedural realism:
(1) What do we mean by “point” of the continuum, the line, which is,
for Heraclitus, Zeno and even Euclid, just a figure of an ever changing flow?
How could one assign to this point a subset of natural numbers and what is
the price of such an assignment?
(2) Vice versa, what do we mean by “subset of natural numbers”? How
could one assign to it a point on the continuum and what might be the price
of this assignment?
(3) And finally, what it means and how one might be sure that our
procedures cover all points and all subsets ?
Now, even a brief analysis of Cantor’s powerset construction applied to
the set of natural numbers demonstrates that it does not invalidate but, quite
to the contrary, vindicates Zeno’s intuition and deepens its implications:
(1) The bijection P(N) ∼= R is far from being symmetric and procedu-
rally evenhanded. As a matter of fact, given a well-defined subset of natural
numbers, one is relatively free “to mark a point” on the continuum by con-
structing the corresponding real number with the help of, say, the continuum
fraction device.
(2) To proceed, however, in the opposite direction, from a point well-
defined algebraically, analytically, or by another explicit, “surfing over the
continuum flow” procedure – distinct from the discrete in its nature powerset
construction – to a subset of natural numbers, one would need to execute
an algorithm (such as the algorithm of Euclid calculating the corresponding
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continuous fraction from, say, a given system of equations) with a generally
speaking infinite number of steps.
(3) The irregular and unpredictable discontinuity character of Cantor’s
powerset construction points in the same direction: the passage from the
marker of a point on the continuum flow to the marker of another one is
accidental, irregular, whereas the flow itself is moving along at every one of
its points continuously and uniformly.
(4) Moreover, we have no hope to ever reach all points of this flow: “not
all propositions of the form
α is a transcendental number
are expressible, or definable in a language, since there are uncountably many
transcendental numbers” (Finsler, 1926; cf. [21], p. 8.)
Making the Point 3 : Negligibility of the Impact of Our Occasional
Stepping into the Continuum Flow.
(1) Alternatively to the “stepping into a continuum flow”, one can see
Cantor’s powerset device as sort of “a scaffolding of the continuum skyscraper
under perpetual construction”, with each particular subset of natural numbers
defining a transcendental number α being a discreet, sequential “ladder of
ascent”, typically infinite, to α (cf. the epigraph to Chapter 6.2 below).
(2) Our usage, above, of the qualifier well-defined applied both to real
numbers, or points of the continuum, and to (infinite) subsets of natural
numbers is as intuitively transparent and informal as the one systematically
employed by Cantor (cf., e.g., his “law of thought” statement in the above
Section 1.1).
(3) It means that, without specifically restricting the interpretation of
well-defined to constructively defined, according to one or another version
of Constructivism, one can safely assume that the human activity, whatever
might be its intensity, sophistication, and prolongation, might be able to actu-
ally “probe individually into” only countable many points of continuum and,
respectively, subsets of natural numbers.
(4) The extension of these apparently innocent observations about Can-
tor’s powerset machinery of reaching out for points on the continuum to
well-defined subsets of the continuum will have substantial implications for
Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis: cf. the next section.
(5) The suggested limits of this machinery do not preclude the existence
of other – analytic, algebraic, number-theoretic, etc. – methods of reaching
out for the Uncountable. The interplay between such non-set-theoretic and
set-theoretic methods is discussed in the next section.
14
2.5 Continuum Hypothesis: From Point Centered to
Subset Centered Set Theory
Now comes Cantor’s radical conceptual leap from the point-centered to the
subset-centered approach to the theory of Continuum, and at this conceptual
threshold – leading, as David Hilbert claimed ([30], p. 376), into “the paradise
Cantor created for us” from where “no one shall be able to drive us” – we
have to abandon for good our Greek companions, albeit not their astute,
austere epistemic methodology.
To start with, Cantor has advanced (1878) the first, naif version of his
Continuum Hypothesis, which has appeared later as number one on the fa-
mous list of most important unsolved mathematical problems presented by
David Hilbert during the Mathematical Congress at the University of Sor-
bonne, Paris, in 1900:
Conjecture 1 CHWE: Continuum Hypothesis in Its Weak Equipo-
tency Form. Given a well-defined sub-totality of the real line, X ⊂ R, it is
either empty, or finite, or countable, or equipotent with the continuum.
This weak equipotency version of the Continuum Hypothesis, leaving to
its prover to specify the subset of the continuum whose power she/he wants
to compare with the four known powers, fits perfectly into Cantor’s early
mathematical experience (1872) of explicit construction of infinite sets of
convergency points of trigonometric series. After introducing perfect sets,
Cantor was able to prove CHWE for all closed sets. This was the beginning
of Descriptive Set Theory [37]
For better or worse, this has not been the end of the story. Being inspired
by a much more radical vision of the discrete-continous opposition than Zeno,
Cantor “freed himself of all fetters and manipulated the set concept without
any restriction” – as Hermann Weyl puts it disapprovingly in [60] (p. 50). In
particular, Cantor’s full equipotency version of the Continuum Hypothesis
deals not with carefully specified sub-totalities, but either with any sub-
totality or with the collection of all sub-totalities of the continuum:
Conjecture 2 CHFE: Continuum Hypothesis in Its Full Equipo-
tency Form. Any sub-totality X of R is either finite, or countable, or
equipotent with the continuum.
This exercise assumes, implicitly or explicitly, the existence of the power-
set of the continuum and thus extends the portability of the original Canto-
rian powerset construction beyond the countability case, where its legitimacy
has been assured by the analytically defined bijection R ∼= 2N, with the two
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“mathematical habitats” N and R well known “experimentally” and opera-
tionally long before the invention of the powerset gadget:
“This does not prove the legitimacy of the [universal] powerset principle.
For the argument is not: we have a perfectly clear intuitive picture of the con-
tinuum, and the powerset principle enables us to capture this set-theoretically.
Rather, the argument is: the powerset principle (or principles which imply
it) was revealed in our attempts to make our intuitive picture of the contin-
uum analytically clearer; in so far as these attempts are successful, then the
powerset principle gains some confirmatory support.” ([28], p. 213.)
Making the Point 4 : Cantor’s Infinite Powerset Construction Is
Fully Context-Dependable. The immediate and obvious extension of the
above “price-sensitivity” analysis, Section 2.4, demonstrates the context-depen-
dable character of Cantor’s infinite powerset operation P(S),S being an in-
finite set: this operation is designed to act on, and only on the countable
type of such sets, and it is meaningfully and ultimately formally sustainable
only in this context. All other applications of this operation to infinite sets,
as e.g., in the case of the “set” P(R) of all real functions of one variable
whose “cardinality” is denoted by f = 2c, are pure set-theoretical notations,
certainly useful as such, but ontologically void of any verifiable reference to
an objectively observable, meaningful reality context.
Hence the following Thesis – the principle or conjecture which specifies
only partially or informally, or leaves open altogether an important segment
of its formal assumptions – going back to Cantor’s original insight, similar
and, as we believe, ontologically and epistemically related, prior, and superior
to Church-Turing’s Thesis (cf. Section 6.1):
Thesis 1 : On the Continuum Hypothesis.
(1) Whatever might be a specific extension of the qualifier well-defined,
any well-defined subset of the continuum is either empty, or finite, or count-
able, or equipotent with the continuum.
(2) The Continuum Hypothesis makes no sense outside the above “well-
defined” version.
To give the reader a foretaste of possible conceptual realizations of the
qualifier well-defined, here is its simplest and popular ordinary mathematics
version:
“We identify as ordinary or non-set-theoretic that body of mathematics
which is prior to or independent of the introduction of abstract set-theoretical
concepts. ... The distinction between set-theoretic and ordinary mathematics
corresponds roughly to the distinction between ‘uncountable mathematics’ and
‘countable mathematics.” ([55], p. 1)
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2.6 Cantor’s Unrestricted Uses of the Powerset Con-
struction
Of course, Cantor himself was absolutely free from, in fact, blissfully un-
aware of the eventuality of any ontological and epistemic misgivings about
unrestricted uses of his powerset device, the misgivings similar to those raised
above. Quite to the contrary, the powerset operation was for Cantor not only
universally applicable, but also unrestrictedly and eventually transfinitely it-
eratively auto-applicable:
Axiom 1 : Powerset
For each set A there exists a set B, called the powerset of A,P(A), whose
members, or elements, are the subsets of A.
Now, Cantor’s diagonal argument used to prove that the cardinality of
the continuum is strictly bigger than that of the set of natural numbers,
Section 2.4, c = card(R) = card(P(N)) > card(N) = ω, is readily available
for the proof of the general inequality card(P(A)) > card(A), which gives
rise to Cantor’s original transfinitely growing hierarchy of set:
N,R = P(N),P(R),P(P(R)), . . .
with their respective cardinalities
ℵ0 = i0,i1,i2, . . .
It is at this first critical juncture of the realization of his transfinite de-
sign, to assure that every set of the Universe of sets fits at some place in the
emerging, powerset device driven hierarchy (with some less dramatic adjust-
ments presently delivered by the Axioms of emptyset, pairset, extensionality,
union, etc. [45]) that Cantor needed his Universal Cardinal Comparability
Principle.
2.7 Cantor’s Universal Cardinal Comparability Princi-
ple and Two Ontologically Distinct Sources of Sets
>From the point of view of a naif set theory, the universal principle of cardinal
comparability appeared to Cantor both immediate, natural, and ultimately
more important than that of the his well-ordering “law of thought” to which
we turn our attention in the next chapter. And Cantor’s discovery (1882) of
the comparative antisymmetry property A <c B and B <c A =⇒ A ∼ B,
known today as Schröder-Bernstein theorem and being a part of what might
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be called ordinary mathematics (cf. the above quote from [55]), looked like
just the first, and for that matter promising step in the right direction.
However, as things stand today, the set-theoretical enforceability of the
universal comparability principle demands the same axiomatic strength as,
and is formally equivalent to Cantor’s universal well-ordering principle (cf.,
e.g., [45], pp. 120-121).
In other words, this enforceability came with a price tag which, more than
hundred years after Ernst Zermelo’s proof of this principle, is still hounding
the research into the Infinite.
It is instructive to trace the conceptual and formal breakthroughs leading
to this state of set-theoretic affairs [14], [44], [28]. What is still missing, we be-
lieve, in such analyses is the understanding of the transformation of Cantor’s
original theory of the Infinite based on two, initially independent ontologi-
cal sources of set tokens, continuum and ordinal, into his global transfinite
design which was steadily evolving ever since from favoring the foundational
value of ordinals over that of the continuum to unreservedly – and, as we
claim, undeservedly – absorbing the latter by the former.
Which brings us straight out to Cantor’s ordinal invention.
3 Ordinals: Their Awe-Inspiring Beauty, Their
Necessary Uses, Their Peremptory Abuses
“A team of Hollywood techno-wizards set out to ‘bring ’em back alive’. So
they took a little artistic license to make them half again as large. Anyway,
what did books know? Then a surprising thing happened. In Utah, paleontol-
ogists found bones of a real raptor, and it was the size of the movie’s beast.
‘We were cutting edge’, says the film’s chief modelmaker with a pathfinder’s
pride.‘After we created it, they discovered it’.” (Andrea Dorfman, Behind
the Magic of Jurassic Park, Times International 1993, n. 17, pp. 53-54.)
3.1 The Beauty and Efficiency of Ordinal Construction
Redux on the Outside the Cantorian Set Theory
Independently of the listed above, Section 2.4, classical in their transparency
and beauty clarifications of the fundamental relationships between two known
to Greeks infinite mathematical habitats, N and R, Georg Cantor had an
extraordinary in its originality and beauty idea to extend the counting, or
ordinal attributing, beyond natural numbers – into the invented by him trans-
finite ordinal realm.
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Became acquainted with Cantor’s transfinite numbers, David Hilbert, for
once, did not mince the words to praise it:
“This appears to me to be the most admirable flower of the mathemati-
cal intellect and in general one of the highest achievements of pure rational
human activity.” ([30], p. 373)
Typically of David Hilbert, it was his enthusiasm, and not that of the orig-
inal designer, Cantor (cf. the next section), that proved authentic, prophetic
– and totally selfless:
(1) Today, nobody is surprised that a research paper on, say, termination
proof techniques for Term Rewriting Systems, or TRS, which play an impor-
tant role in automated deduction and abstract data type specifications, starts
as follows:
“Cantor invented the ordinal numbers
0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, n+ 1, . . . ω, ω + 1, . . .
ω2, . . . ωn, . . . ω2, . . . ωn, . . . ωω, . . . ω ↑ n, . . .
ε0, . . . ε
ε0
0 , . . . ε1, . . . εε0 , . . . , and so on.
(1)
Each ordinal is larger than all preceding ones, and is typset of them all:
ω = the set of all natural numbers;
ω2 = ω ∪ {ω + n | n ∈ ω};
ωn = ∪i<nωi;
ω2 = ∪n∈ωωn;
ωω = ω ↑ 2 = ∪n∈ωωn;
ω ↑ n = ∪i<nω ↑ i;
ε0 = ω
ε0 = ∪n∈ωω ↑ n;
εε00 = ω
ε02 ;
ε1 = ∪n∈ωε0 ↑ n.
(2)
The notation α ↑ n represents a tower of n αs.” ([16], p. 243)
Notice that in common parlance “Cantor invented ” or “created ”, not “dis-
covered’ ’, the ordinal numbers.
After the above most succinct and transparent introduction to ordinals,
the author demonstrates how the ordinal descent can be used to prove ter-
mination for particular classes of TRS s, with the general TRS termination
problem (a special case of the halting problem for Turing machines) being of
course undecidable.
As to the ordinal descent, it is an important special case of descent along
partially ordered sets, in particular, along trees. One of Cantor’s most fruitful
ideas has been the notion of a well-ordering, WO, i. e., of a linearly ordered
set fulfilling the condition of finite descent, FD, i. e., of termination after a
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finite number of steps of any descending subsequence (ordinals are, of course,
special WOs). The principal merit of the FD condition is the extendibility
of the mechanism of Mathematical Induction beyond natural numbers to any
WO and, in particular, to any ordinal.
(2) The first discovery of the necessary uses (according to Harvey Fried-
man’s favorite phraseology and the title of his seminal paper [22]) of transfi-
nite numbers in what has been called above ordinary mathematics was made
much earlier – just ten years after Hilbert’s pronouncement.
Namely, Gerhard Gentzen [24] has proved that the validity of the law of
mathematical induction along Cantor’s ordinal segment 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . ω, ω +
1, . . . ε0 , is equivalent to the statement of the consistency of Peano arith-
metic. It is worth to mention that, among other things, Gentzen’s result
has brought with it a dignified, even if only partial and, for that matter,
countable rehabilitation of Hilbert’s program [48].
Gentzen’s approach gave birth to Ordinal Analysis whose objective is to
provide ordinal certificates for the consistency of more or less complete and
constructive fragments of artihmetic and analysis: see the paragraph (5)
below.
(3) About ten years after Gentzen, it was Reuben L. Goodstein who has
discovered an elementary, natural, and yet number-theoretically meaningful
and aesthetically appealing arithmetical proposition of Peano arithmetic [26],
readily understandable to high school students but not provable in Peano
arithmetic – because any proof of this proposition requires the necessary use
of a transfinite induction up to ε0.
Goodstein’s has been also the first meaningful and elementary mathe-
matical statement illustrating in Peano’s elementary axiomatic framework
the incompleteness theorem of Kurt Gödel. Almost forty years later, Laurie
Kirby and Jeff Paris, the re-discoverers of the misunderstood and forgot-
ten result of Goodstein, have added to the emerging list of such elementary
examples their “Hercules against Hydra battle” [38].
(4) Then, in 1949, Alan Turing has given a remarkable general interpre-
tation of explicitly defined countable ordinals as succinct symbolic notations
for algorithmic structures with multiple loops [58] – the interpretation which
inspired a series of remarkable results on the program verification illustrated,
in particular, by the quoted above paper [16] .
(5) There is no other field of mathematics and mathematical logic where
the suggestive, interpretive, and creative power of Cantor’s ordinal construc-
tion is more pronounced and more effective than Ordinal Analysis which
builds on and integrates all aforementioned breakthroughs:
“The central theme of ordinal analysis is the classification of theories by
means of transfinite ordinals that measure their ‘consistency strength’ and
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‘computational power’. The so-called proof-theoretic ordinal of a theory also
serves to characterize its provably recursive functions and can yield both con-
servation and combinatorial independence results.” ([48], p. 45)
Making the Point 5 : Countable Ordinals as Formal Devices for
Measuring the Onto-Epistemic Limits of Particular Iterative Meth-
ods.
(1) By their very meaning and formal definition, proof-theoretic ordinals
should be countable [47], [50], which means that the study of more and more
“strong” axiomatic theories goes hand in hand with the never ending upgrading
of the hierarchy of “large” countable ordinals:
• from ω to ω2, the proof-theoretic ordinal of RFA, rudimentary function
arithmetic;
• ω3 and EFA, elementary function arithmetic;
• ωω and PRA, primitive recursive arithmetic;
• 0 and Peano arithmetic;
• Γ0, Feferman-Schütte predicativity ordinal, the proof-theoretical ordinal
of ATR0, arithmetic transfinite recursion;
• . . .
• and so on – beyond predicativity, recursive notations, and eventually
– beyond all known today explicit notational and combinatorial descriptions,
toward new, today unknown and unimaginable iterative insights and devices.
(2) In particular, Ordinal Analysis provides us with the independent evi-
dence of existence of corresponding countable ordinals. In other words, “after
Georg Cantor has created them, Gerhard Gentzen, Reuben L. Goodstein and
their followers have discovered them”.
Hence the following Thesis which is aspiring to capture the emerging in
the above cases of Ordinal Analysis general pattern and to extrapolate it
to future breakthroughs in our understanding of, paraphrasing [48] (p. 45)
the “consistency strength, computational power, and combinatorial sophisti-
cation”:
Thesis 2 : The Onto-Epistemic Interpretation of Cantor’s Class
of Countable Ordinals.
(1) The collection ω1 of countable ordinals is the authentic, universal,
ever emerging and never completed formal ordinal measure scale of the power
and sophistication of iterative logical arguments and methods.
(2) In particular, ω1 is a proper class.
(3) The statement of such conceptual generality and formal vagueness
cannot be either proved, or falsified otherwise than by a discovery of neces-
sary use(s) of ω1 in ordinary mathematics providing an independent evidence
of its existence.
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Discussion. (1) If one assumes the truth of the first part of the above
thesis, the ontological justification of its second part is readily and naturally
available:
(2) The assumption that ω1 is a set and, thus, ordinal implies roughly
that one can create a new iterative method by uniting all iterative methods
which are already in place or will be ever invented – which is meaningless.
From the ontological point of view, the confusion comes from a substitution
of implications of the real temporal eternity, which could not be amplified, by
those of mathematical infinity, which permits different procedures of ever in-
creasing iterative complexity, to overstep all already discerned and formalized
limits.
(3) At present, there exists no convincing and sustainable results of nec-
essary uses of the Uncountable. To give just one example: the method which
relates the structure of elementary embeddings associated with large car-
dinals to that of self-distributive algebras and braid groups has been later
supplanted by direct, not involving the Uncountable proofs [13]. This ex-
ample illustrates both the methodological and proof-theoretical richness of
the existing theories of the Uncountable and the eventual countable inter-
pretability of the uses of such theories in ordinal mathematics.
We are elaborating the foundational implications of these informal in-
sights below, Section 5.
3.2 Cantor’s Transfinite Design Takes Shape – at a Price:
a Clear-cut Case of the Abuse of the Ordinal Device
The above thesis, if true, disqualifies both Georg Cantor’s definition of the
first uncountable ordinal, Section 3.1, and the known axiomatic foundations
of set theory, such as ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel with the Axiom of Choice,
AC), which count among their provable statements the well-ordering theo-
rem and, thus, the ordinal characterization of ω1. The implications of this
new foundational crisis will be discussed in Chapter 5.
But this will happen later ... For now, we still have to patiently follow
the founder of set theory.
Similarly to what happened with the discovery of the powerset operation,
Section 2.6, it is at this second critical juncture of the realization of his
transfinite design, that Cantor – not giving a damn about the only ordinal
numbers he has actually designed, the countable ones [16], and blissfully
unaware of their future astonishing and brilliant necessary uses [22] – has
been exclusively interested in their eventual transposal into the domain of
the uncountable.
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Ultimately, Cantor succeeded to do this by postulating that the well-
ordered collection of all countable ordinals is a set and, consequently, the
least uncountable ordinal ω1 of the cardinality ℵ1.
With this methodologically peremptory, epistemicly perfunctory, onto-
logically unwarranted break-in into the uncountable, Cantor has finally fully
consolidated his firm hold on the well-ordered design of the Universe of sets –
leaving to the future generations of mathematicians to gasp air for its viable
axiomatic foundations and, among other things, to resolve the pure cardi-
nal interpretation of the Continuum Hypothesis which suddenly became its
only official version (regretfully, even according to Kurt Gödel’s insightful
presentation [25]):
Conjecture 3 : CHCV : Continuum Hypothesis, the Cardinal Ver-
sion.
Prove that ℵ1 = c = 2ℵ0 , or find another aleph of the cardinal hierarchy
equal to c.
The striking, almost number-theoretic in its simplicity ordinal-cardinal
interpretation of the original phenomenological versions of the Continuum
Hypothesis, Section 2.5, became so attractive that virtually all speaking
about the Continuum Hypothesis, such an authority in fundamental mat-
ters as CH , Kurt Gödel including [25], are formulating it as a conjecture
about cardinals, CHCV , without ever mentioning its more tangible origins.
Today, after more than hundred years of arduous efforts by thousands
of researchers, some share a remote hope that Cantor might get it wrong
and that, in fact, ℵ1 < c = ℵ2 = card(ω2), with ω2 being the collection of all
ordinals whose cardinality does not exceed ℵ1, or in other words, the ordinals
which are either finite or countable or equipotent with the first uncountable
ordinal ω1 . . .
Others, and they are in the majority, either do not care anymore or dis-
own, on foundational grounds of all possible persuasions, the very legitimacy
of CH , as in the following statement of Solomon Feferman [20] squarely
aiming at the cardinal version of CH :
“I came to the conclusion some years ago that CH is an inherently vague
problem. This was based partly on the results from the metatheory of set the-
ory showing that CH is independent of all remotely plausible axioms extend-
ing ZFC, including all large cardinal axioms that have been proposed so far.
In fact it is consistent with all such axioms (if they are consistent at all) that
the cardinal number of the continuum can be ‘anything it ought to be’, i.e.
anything which is not excluded by König’s theorem. The other basis for my
view is philosophical: I believe there is no independent platonic reality that
gives determinate meaning to the language of set theory in general, and to
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the supposed totality of arbitrary subsets of the natural numbers in particular,
and hence not to its cardinal number.”
4 Posterior Axiomatizations of Cantor’s Trans-
finite Blueprint: Foundational Challenge
In this and next chapters, we are attempting to reconcile our ontological
limitations on both the uses of the powerset device, Section 2.6, and of the
set-theoretic status of Cantor’s ordinal collection ω1, Section 3.1, with the
existing and intensively evolving since already hundred years theoretical and
formal foundational tradition.
To this end, we revise in the present chapter both (1) the fundamental ex-
plicit and unspoken onto-epistemological and formal set-theoretical assump-
tions, the bedrock of ZFC axiomatics and its Large Cardinals extensions,
and (2) its almost universally ignored sustainability implications.
4.1 Ptolemaic-like Deadlock of ZF−based and Ever Ex-
tending Axiomatics of the Cantorian Set Theory
In the spirit of Kurt Gödel’s legacy of pure (meta-)mathematical and de-
tached of any ontological considerations interpretations of formal axiomati-
zations of set theory, one cannot but conclude that Cantor’s intuitive per-
ception of the unlimited ascension along some platonically pre-existing lad-
der of large ordinals and cardinals could be formally realized today only at
the price of the invention of never ending extensions of the ZF axiomatic
which are themselves belonging to some platonically pre-existing ladder of
set-theoretical principles ...
And so on ? Indeed:
“As our edifice grew, we saw how one by one the large cardinals fell into
place in a linear hierarchy. This is especially remarkable in view of the os-
tensibly disparate ideas that motivate their formulation. As remarked by H.
Friedman, this hierarchical aspect of the theory of large cardinals is somewhat
a mystery ... In other words, is there a hierarchy of set-theoretical princi-
ples in another galaxy above ZFC, disjoint and incomparable to our large
cardinals ? ” ([36], p. 104)
This paradigm of never ending axiomatic adjustments, at any given ax-
iomatic juncture never sufficient to settle, say, Cantor’s Continuum Hypoth-
esis, reminds us of the Ptolemaic millenarian deadlock of unending and ever
more complicated adjustments of his system of epicyclic planetary orbits to
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new, more precise astronomical observations of planets supposedly moving
around the Earth – the theological (according initially to the Pythagorean
tradition and later on to the Biblical one), ontological (according initially
to Aristotelean and then to scholastic philosophy), physical and, in the line
with all such religious, cultural, and scientific intellectual certainties, the
mathematical center of the observable Universe.
4.2 Ontological and Epistemic Construals: Consistency,
Relevancy, and Truth
The eventual foundational repercussions of Feferman’s “above the brawl ” pes-
simism (cf. the above quote from [20], the last section of the previous chap-
ter) concerning the legitimacy of the Continuum Hypothesis, CH , pale into
insignificance compared to our actual disavowal of the onto-epistemological
sustainability of the whole Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatics, ZFC, and its Ax-
ioms of Large Cardinals extensions – from the applicability of the powerset
device beyond its original countable limits, Sections 2.5, 2.6 (cf. Feferman’s
final remark), to the legitimacy of the ordinal characterization of the collec-
tion ω1 of countable ordinals, Sections 3.1, 3.2.
Our “hands-on” approach to the foundational challenge presented by Can-
tor’s transfinite blueprint has everything to do with the four-term, onto-
epistemological relevancy scheme discussed in Section 2.3:
RSCN : {ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemic sustainability ⇔ CN}.
Before putting our back into the foundational business, however, let us
make it clear that our approach is not inspired by, or restricted to a particular
philosophical or mathematical school of thought, be it Constructivism (even if
we are quoting with an indubitable sympathy Hermann Weyl’s constructivist
puns), or Platonism (even if we fully sympathize with Kurt Gödel’s Platonic
dictums), or something reasonably else.
Our only criterion of the truth of axiomatics whose consistency is either
formally demonstrated or contextually implied is their explanatory power and
success, or onto-epistemological relevancy and sustainability, as expressed by
the above four-term RSCN scheme.
Thus, in no way doubting the scientific and mathematical value of any of
the flourishing schools of modern set theory, we assert that any criterion of
axioms plausibility definitely and exclusively equalling consistency to truth is
lacking substance and strength to secure the onto-epistemological relevancy
and sustainability of its eventual mathematical implications.
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The below “consistency-equals-truth credo” of W. Hugh Woodin recog-
nizes this by subjecting the truth of an axiom to, in this particular case, its
ultimate “number theoretic consequences” ([62], p. 31):
“For me, granting the truth of the axioms for Set Theory, the only con-
ceivable argument against the truth of this axiom [Projective Determinacy
Axiom], would be its inconsistency. I also claim that, at present, the only
credible basis for the belief that the axiom is consistent is the belief that the
axiom is true. This state of affairs could change as the number theoretic
consequences of the axiom become more fully understood.”
4.3 Constative vs Performative Axiomatic Paradigms:
Performative-Iterative Wishful Axiomatic Thinking
Our main foundational argument, developed below, Section 4.3 concerns the
nature of axioms of Set Theory, from ZF to ZFC to Axioms of Determi-
nacy to Axioms of Large Cardinals, which are typically inductive principles
and procedures of emergence of set-theoretical entities acting on swaths of
transfinite ordinals and cardinals [33].
This is why they postulate the characteristics of such entities at least as
much as – and probably, transfinitly less than – they postulate our compu-
tational and deductive proof-theoretical credentials – finite, countable, and
uncountable [47], [48].
This is also why are misplaced all analogies of set-theoretical axiomatics
with, say, geometric axiomatics, as are misplaced the analogies between func-
tions defined directly and by finite procedures – analytically, algebraically,
or number-theoretically – and algorithmically, i.e., by a priori arbitrary re-
cursive functions and procedures.
Here is just one and, for that matter, well-argued example of the popular
genre of set-theoretical apologetics:
“For instance, the proof that the axiom of parallels does not follow from
the other Euclid axioms did not close geometry, but made the emergence of
non-Euclidian geometries possible, and opened the question of recognizing,
among all possible geometries, the most relevant for describing the physical
world. Likewise, Gödel’s and Cohen’s results show that several universes
are possible from ZFC, and, therefore, they open the study of the various
possible universes.” [15]
As a matter of fact, the above analogy only sharpens up our case:
(1) The Axioms of Euclidean geometry do not generate objects, and being
strictly fact-finding, or constative, not creative or performative, utterances,
as Set-Theoretical Axioms, they were carefully distilled by Greek mathemati-
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cians from every-day geometrical experiences, representing straightforward,
almost banal in their simplicity and transparency abstractions of basic and
immediately and universally observable objects and their relationships.
(2) As to Set-Theoretical Axioms, they are designed mostly ad hoc to
urgently and in many cases rather arbitrary fill in the logical and iterative
lacunas and thus to justify after the fact some risky iterative flights of our
unruly mathematical fancy. In short, those are axioms one needs to believe
[41] rather than be banally sure of.
(3) As to “the emergence of non-Euclidian geometries becoming possible”
– in the 19th century, two thousand years after the Euclidian axiomatics
– this historical fact should be in the first place attributed to the general
cultural trend inspired and guided by the accumulation of the scientific ex-
perience related to the geometric relativity and closely associated with the
slow replacement of the Ptolemaic geocentric system (emerged in the first
half of the 2nd century to be later dogmatically asserted in the Western
Christendom) by Copernicus’ heliocentric system made public in 1543.
(4) This does not mean that we doubt the portability of learning ex-
periences gained as the result of the passage from the strictly Euclidian to
non-Euclidian geometries. Quite to the contrary: we believe that there is
an important lesson to learn from this historical experience – any true rev-
olution in mathematics comes as a fruit of an acquisition of radically novel
ontological and epistemic, which means also universal cultural and intellec-
tual, paradigms.
(5) It is also true that, in contradistinction to geometry, the origins of
modern set-theory were unashamedly metaphysical and even “theological”,
as are today the inspirational impulses of new axiomatic initiatives.
Cantor himself was quite unapologetic about his motives. Here he is,
writing hundred years ago to Father Thomas Esser in Rome ([43], p. 94):
“The establishing of the principles of mathematics and the natural sciences
is the responsibility of metaphysics. Hence metaphysics must look on them as
her children and as her servants and helpers, whom she must not let out of
her sight, but must watch over and control, as the queen bee in a hive sends
into the garden thousands of industrious bees, to suck nectar from the flowers
and then together under her supervision, to turn it into precious honey, and
who must bring her, from the wide realm of the material and spiritual world,
the building blocks to finish her palace.”
Today, philosophical and metaphysical insights continue to shape – both
implicitly and explicitly and more than any other source of formal intuition
– the bulk of “theological ventures” of modern set theory:
“The adaptation of strong axioms of infinity is thus a theological venture,
involving basic questions of belief concerning what is true about the universe.
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However, one can alternatively construe work in the theory of large cardi-
nals as formal mathematics, that is to say the investigation of those formal
implications provable in first-order logic.” ([36], p. 104)
4.4 Cantorian Operational and Generative and Hilber-
tian Universal and Argumentative Reductionism
Alert to the Intended Meaning of the Reductionism Dismissal.
The focal point of the following critical remarks is the dangers of the
reductionist dismissal of ontology in the favor of pre-programmed ideological
imperatives – one of the main topics of the philosophical interest of the present
study. Our criticism does not concern the reductionist methodology by itself,
which is an indispensable and powerful instrument inseparable from the basic
scientific idea of breaking a difficult problem into much more amenable to
formal treatment pieces.
All eventual extraneous criticisms notwithstanding, it was and remains
the reductive enemy within which is most harmful to the free exercise of a
researcher’s metaphysical imagination. Thus, Albert Einstein, the discoverer
of physical quants, could not accept non-local implications of the Quantum
Theory because of his insistence of the universality of local causality.
The absolute type of Cantor’s reductionism should not be confused with
his or Gödelian or, for that matter, Finslerian Platonism which is in principle
compatible with an open, emerging universe of ideas about sets.
Rather this militant Reductionism, forcefully imposing its pre-conceived,
ontologically rigid and epistemicly arbitrary designs on the laws of the do-
main one is supposed to discover and not to invent, was the product of the
ideologically uniform, peremptory mindset of the XIXth century’s philosophy
of science.
Other examples abound. In fact, one can assert somewhat schematically
that:
(i) the diversity of the material Universe was reduced by Simon-Pierre
Laplace to determinist implications of the laws of Newtonian Mechanics,
(ii) while the destiny of civilizations, according to Karl Marx, is governed
by economic laws and struggles of classes,
(iii) with the natural section mechanism of Charles Darwin being made
responsible for the diversity, riches and beauties of the biological life,
(iv) whereas Sigmund Freud was proclaiming the sexual drive, libido to
be the single fundamental creative force behind the personal destiny of man.
In the set-theoretical context, it was this local generative reductionist
liability that has most distorted, in the present author’s opinion, the future
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development of Set Theory – by insisting on perpetual inventing and piling
up new transfinite generative mechanisms as the only remedy to persisting
explanatory lacunas.
Two of these mechanisms invented by Cantor himself stand out as ap-
parently immediately “given”: the powerset principle and the accumulation
of new alephs by transfinite induction coming from two different and, as we
claim, Chapter 6, ontologically distinct and epistemicly unrelated sources of
mathematical experience, the continuum and the discrete.
To summarize our grievances, we contest here, first, the blind, automatic
extrapolation and extension of these two procedures beyond their original
ontological matrices, respectively: the powerset representation of the con-
tinuum and the universe of countable ordinals. Similar “more is different”
doubts concerning the reductionist ignoring the scale of the viability and the
emergent nature of established concepts and laws have been raised by physi-
cists [1], [40]. Second, we contest the ontological soundness of the amalgama-
tion of these two procedures into one “linear ascending ladder” (cf. Cantor’s
formula in the epigraph to Chapter 6.2 below) of ℵ’s and i’s, Section 2.6 ...
... And then, in the middle of the first foundational crisis, it was the turn
of David Hilbert to enter the fray with his global argumentative reduction-
ism which was attempting to reduce all mathematical reasoning to a fully
formalized mechanical proof-theoretic procedure.
Until, that is, Kurt Gödel’s has demonstrated that the unexpected and
inexplicable are always there to defy our currently available fully formalized
and assertive self-confidence [64].
4.5 Hilbertian, Post-Hilbertian, Gödelian Programs and
Their Gödelian & Post-Gödelian Stumbling-Blocks
David Hilbert’s foundational expectations and their brutal refutal by Kurt
Gödel created the most disheartening paradigm of the formal scientific think-
ing: the stronger are the axiomatic foundations or, in other words, the ex-
pressive power of a formal theory, the more inevitably stumbles one upon very
natural and formally admissible in this theory claims which can be neither
proved nor refuted without some nontrivial extension of the said axiomatic
foundations. And in most interesting cases, the extension in question has
to be either the claim itself or – apparently, rather arbitrary and with equal
plausibility – its logical negation ! [5], [6]
The challenge to recover in this atmosphere of consistency relativism the
viable foundations of set theory has been ultimately and, for that matter,
most reluctantly accepted by Kurt Gödel.
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Unfortunately, the liberator of the foundational metamathematical re-
search from the illusions of the Hilbertian argumentative reductionism fell
himself under the spell of the Cantorian ideological Reductionism casting
itself as Platonism. Most regrettably, discussing the importance and per-
spectives of the Continuum Hypothesis, CH , in his seminal article [25],
Kurt Gödel has wholeheartedly accepted Cantor’s transfinite design and the
cardinal interpretation of CH . This inexorably led him into advancing a pro-
gram of the search for new performative axioms of set theory – the axioms
that are strong enough to answer questions left undecided by the standard
axioms ZFC.
Gödel’s reputation for perspicacity, prudence, and intellectual integrity
has been apparently decisive in influencing the ensuing gold rush into “High
Infinite” [35].
The excesses of this very abstract, almost ideological trend could be cor-
rected by a thinker of a more realistic, computational cast, such as Alan Tur-
ing who discovered both an alternative, algorithmic interpretation of count-
able ordinal procedures [58] (cf. Section 3.1), and the Halting Barrier, the
undecidability of the Halting Problem, an algorithmic projection of Gödel’s
incompleteness results: there is no “halting Turing machine” capable of dis-
tinguishing between halting and non-halting programs [57]. In other words,
given a program, the only way to discover whether it halts or not is to run
it – possibly, indefinitely.
Today, sixty years after the publication of the first installment of Gödel’s
program [25], here is an informal version of such a correction:
Thesis 3 : Post-Turing Halting Barrier for Performative Set-theo-
retical Axioms of Iterative Nature.
There exists neither general metamathematical principle, nor logical cri-
terion, nor verifiably terminating computational procedure to establish the
objective and substantial “truth” of a performative set-theoretical axiom of it-
erative nature which postulates the existence of a transfinite object outside the
already existing (say, ZF−based) transfinite scale – otherwise that is than
“to run” the theory completed with the new axiom until it would be discovered
some independent “necessary uses” of the object in question.
There is no other modern domain of formal studies where this post-
modern paradigm is so pronounced as in Set Theory and its ZF -based ax-
iomatics. The trouble is hidden exactly where our ZF pride resides: in the
powerful built-in iterative mechanisms of set generation. In other words,
ZF has gained in its creative power on the expense of its descriptive power,
becoming a sophisticated programming language, which is successfully mim-
icking some aspects of the Mathematical Infinity but whose main thrust lies
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with the providing to advanced “users” sophisticated options of generation of,
and manipulation with artificial transfinite totalities, similarly to computer
graphic imagery of video games – with the Axiom of Determinacy opening
the advent of Infinite Games [35].
Thanks to this interpretation, finds its proper place, in particular, the
puzzling and disconcerting predominance in modern set theory of results on
ZF consistency and independency:
“When modern set theory is applied to conventional mathematical prob-
lems, it has a disconcerting tendency to produce independence results rather
than theorems in the usual sense. The resulting preoccupation with ‘consis-
tency’ rather than ‘truth’ may be felt to give the subject an air of unreality.”
([52], p. 197)
Finally, we claim that all such consistency results are just the instances
of successful program verification.
In other words, the totalities in question are, in fact, pure mathemat-
ical notations not related to any “set-theoretical reality” outside the tight
structure of their definitions and relationships which might turn out to be
suggestive of our permanently evolving iterative programming ability:
“Only the first few levels of the cumulative hierarchy bear any resemblance
to external reality. The rest are a huge extrapolation based on a crude model
of abstract thought processes. Gödel himself comes close to admitting as
much.” ([54], p. 362)
These a fortiori set-theoretical observations and related logical heuristics
suggest the following informal thesis which projects Gödel’s incompleteness
theorems into the realm of the emerging art of “mathematical novelization”:
Thesis 4 : On the Post-Gödelian Incompleteness.
Any conceptually sufficiently rich and logically/axiomatically sufficiently
sophisticated mathematical system allows a huge, super-exponentially expand-
ing “mathematical sci-fi novelization” – the creation of a multitude of “math-
ematical sci-fi novels”, i.e., fully consistent mathematical theories with unlim-
itedly extending axiomatic bases – “forced themselves upon us”, as it were, not
only “as being true” ([?], p. 268) but being also intellectually compelling and
esthetically attractive – and yet which do not have in their (more than) over-
whelming majority, either at this juncture or whenever in future, any objec-
tively verifiable mathematical and/or substantial extra-mathematical meaning
outside the proper, self-absorbed scene of formal deductions inside the system
in question.
Criterion 1 Sustainability Criterion of Viability.
(1) This new mathematical reality suggests the following Onto-Epistemic
Sustainability Criterion of Viability: an axiomatic should ultimately stick as
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close as possible to the onto-epistemologically sustainable notions and rela-
tionships of the underlying mathematical domains:
RSCN : ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemological sustainability ⇔ CN},
(2) The qualifier “ultimately” to the above assertive “stick to” is here not
only to intimate that our Criterion of Viability is unenforceable and, thus,
voluntary. It is also a warning justified by the current mathematical experi-
ence, and not only set-theoretical, that axiomatic efforts in a theory with a
rich ontological base could produce attractive and apparently plausible conjec-
tures and problems of monster logical and proof-theoretical complexity, with
the daunting task to prove or disprove them amounting to the mobilization of
intellectual efforts of all humanity for some centuries.
(3) The examples of the Ptolemaic astronomic system and of the famous
unresolved mathematical problems of Greeks confirm such an eventuality –
even if on a conceptually much more modest scale. It means that the math-
ematically “free-market, easy-going” attitude toward the choice of, and the
level of human and institutional investments into the mathematical domain
should be somehow assisted by responsible and trusted “oracles”. This said,
our pundits could be also wrong, as we believe was wrong Kurt Gödel directing
us into the Large Cardinals morass.
5 Nostalgic Interlude. From the Infinity above
to the Infinity below: Continuum & Ordinals
In his spiritual autobiography, the famous Russian writer and thinker Lev
Nikolayevich Tolstoy transcripts his night dream, somewhen in 1879, of lying
on his back in a bed and trying “to consider how and on what was [he] lying
– a question which had not till then occurred to” him [56] (pp. 46-47):
“And observing my bed, I saw I was lying on plaited string supports at-
tached to its sides. ... I seemed to know that those supports were movable.
... I made a movement with my whole body to adjust myself, fully convinced
that I could do it at once; but the movement caused the ... supports under
me to slip and to become entangled, and I saw that matters were going quite
wrong. ... I looked down and did not believe my eyes. ... I could not even
make out whether I saw anything there below, in that bottomless abyss over
which I was hanging and whither I was being drawn. My heart contracted,
and I experienced horror. ... What am I to do ? What am I to do ? I
ask myself, and look upwards. Above, there is also an infinite space. I look
into the immensity of sky and try to forget about the immensity below, and
32
I really do forget it. ... I know that I am hanging, but I look more and more
into the infinite above me and feel that I am becoming calm. ... And then,
as happen! s in dreams, I imagined the mechanism by means of which I was
held; a very natural intelligible, and sure means, though on one awake that
mechanism has no sense.”
Compare this with Hermann Weyl’s final remarks to his short and lucid
review of the foundational efforts set in motion by the discovery of logical
paradoxes, the challenge which had not till then occurred to mathematicians :
“From this history one thing should be clear: we are less certain than ever
about the ultimate foundations of (logic and) mathematics. Like everybody
and everything in the world today, we have our “crisis”. We have had it for
nearly fifty years. Outwardly it does not seem to hamper our daily work, and
yet I for one confess that it has had a considerable practical influence on
my mathematical life: it directed my interests to fields I considered relatively
“safe”, and it has been a constant drain on my enthusiasm and determination
with which I pursued my research work. The experience is probably shared by
other mathematicians who are not indifferent to what their scientific endeav-
ours mean in the contexts of man’s whole caring and knowing, suffering and
creative existence in the world.” ([59], p. 13)
Today, hundred years after the emergence of the first foundational crisis
in Mathematics, an ordinary mathematician surfs fearlessly on an opportune
wave of new conceptional and formal breakthroughs, carrying out routinely
all necessary to him operations, whether they are supposed to be carried out
by God or by men.
And yet, his carelessness does not affect in the slightest the reality and
importance of the abyss below his feet – Ordinal transfinite, Chapter 3 –
and the immensity of the infinity above his head – the mathematical habitat
called Continuum, Chapter 2, associated with, and deriving its permanently
renewing onto-epistemological relevancy and suggestive power from our be-
ing active “in the presence of the reality flow – the flow thought of as an ever
ongoing, fully external to us, independent of us, and most rich phenomeno-
logically process” (Section 2.2).
Thesis 5 : Two Sources of Mathematical Infinity.
(1) Since at least three thousand years, the Countable and the Continuum
represented two sources of the mathematical intuition associated today with
Mathematical Infinity.
(2) All set-theoretical axioms and infinity notations notwithstanding, the
exclusivity of these sources has been confirmed by the mathematical develop-
ments of the last century.
(3) There exist no other ontological sources of Mathematical Infinity.
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This informal claim complements and generalizes our Continuum Hypoth-
esis Thesis, Section 2.5.
6 Local Causation of “Man’s Mathematics” Ver-
sus Non-Locality of Classical Mathematics
Our point of view is to describe the mathematical
operations that can be carried out by finite beings,
man’s mathematics for short.
In contrast, classical mathematics concerns itself
with operations that can be carried out by God.
Errett Bishop [11], p. 9.
6.1 The Continuum, Suslin’s Problem, Local Causation,
Quantum Non-locality, and Church-Turing Thesis
And what about other, classical and ‘divine’ Mathematics (as Errett Bishop’s
has chosen to descried it)? How about Mathematics of a free surfing on the
real line continuum, starting with the logically unimpeded Classical Analysis
and passing by the famous and still open Suslin’s conjecture?
Problem 1 : Suslin’s Conjecture.
Let K be a linearly ordered set without the first or last element, connected
in order topology, with no uncountable family of pairwise disjoint open inter-
vals. Is K isomorphic to the real line R?([39], p. 66)
Thesis 6 : Non-Locality Characterization of the Continuum.
(1)The striking feature of classical analytic machinery conceived to deal
with, and perfectly adapted to the Continuum habitat, and which immediately
distinguish it from methods and theories subject to the discrete, Ordinal Anal-
ysis related treatment, is its intrinsic, inextinguishable, fundamental, outside
of the Continuum not existing and not obtainable non-locality, in the sense
this term is understood in Quantum Information Processing, or QIP, for
short [46].
(2) Any phenomenologically and ontologically faithful or at least relevant
axiomatization of the Continuum should include a Non-locality Postulate, or
Non-locality Axiomatic Scheme, to formally account for the following prop-
erty of the Continuum:
All ‘points’, or ‘elements’ of the Continuum are non-locally, i.e., simul-
taneously and at any moment, accessible. This non-local accessibility extends
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to all well-defined ‘slices’ (subsets in the set-theoretical terminology) of the
Continuum.
Comments and Implications: From Aristotle to Suslin to Church-
Turing Thesis. (1) The quoted above claim of Aristotle about the mathe-
matical sufficiency of “the sphere of real magnitudes” explicitly denies among
other things such a non-locality characterization of the Continuum. One can
only admire the cleverness, unambiguity, and consistency of Aristotle, the
father of formal logic, who was sticking on this occasion to his and his col-
leagues, from Zenon to Euclid, discrete, local causality interpretation of math-
ematics. For the sake of completeness and facility of the understanding our
argument, we reproduce here Aristotle’s dictum (see for details Section 2.3):
“In point of fact they [mathematicians] do not need the infinite and do not
use it. They postulate only that the finite straight line may be produced as far
as they wish. It is possible to have divided in the same ration as the largest
quantity another magnitude of any size you like. Hence, for the purposes of
proof, it will make no difference to them to have such an infinite instead,
while its existence will be in the sphere of real magnitudes.”
(2)We believe that, the availability of a Non-Locality Postulate in a mod-
ified ZF -like axiomatics – our powerset and ordinal limitations of size being
assured, Sections 2.6, 3.1 – Suslin’s conjecture becomes an easily provable
statement (we will be back to this claim in our forthcoming paper).
(3) To make these observations amendable to an eventual formalization,
Section 6.2 below, let us turn our attention to Robert Gandy’s well-known
real-life analysis [23] of Church’s and Turing’s computability, and in particu-
lar, to Gandy’s Principle of Local Causation, as it is informally and succinctly
summarized by David Israel ([32], p. 197):
“Causal effects must be locally propagated ... There is an upper bound
(e.g., the velocity of light) on the speed of propagation of changes. ... There
is no (unbounded) action at a distance; no simultaneous causation.”
(4) After adding to these principle three other, more material and routine
Principles of Mechanism, Gandy demonstrates that, first, functions com-
putable on such abstract devices are “simply the Turing-computable func-
tions, thus adding a striking bit of evidence for the adequacy and stability of
Turing’s analysis” (ibid.), and second, that each of these four conditions is
necessary to avoid either absurdity, or – especially, in the case of the Princi-
ple of Local Causation – indiscriminate, over-reaching applicability and not
restricted to recursive functions computability.
(5) In a similar vein, Nachum Dershowitz and Yuri Gurevitch [17] have
recently identified three interrelated Sequential Postulates [27] which repre-
sent an algorithmic axiomatization of computability allowing for a proof of
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Church’s and Turing’s theses, with the first of these postulates representing
an algorithmic equivalent of Gandy’s Principle of Local Causation.
6.2 Ordinal Constructions Abide by Principles of Local
Causation
Following the finite there is a transfinite, that is
an unbounded ascending ladder of definite modes,
which by their nature are not finite but infinite,
but which just like the finite can be determined
by definite well-defined and distinguishable num-
bers [notations].
Georg Cantor, 1883, as translated in [28] (p. 39)
Cantor’s “unbounded ascending ladder of infinite modes” is sequential by
its very definition – and, thus, abiding by the transfinite version of the Prin-
ciple of Local Causation, which assumes in this case the form of
Axiom 2 : Principle of Transfinite Induction.
Suppose Ω is a well-ordered totality (set or class), with elements α, β, . . ..
• Induction Hypothesis. Suppose the formula φ(β) holds for all β < α.
• Inductive Step. Suppose that one can prove that whenever the above
Induction Hypothesis is verified, the formula φ(α) holds as well.
• Inductive Conclusion. Then φ holds for all elements of Ω.
(Cf., e.g., the discussion of the Induction principle by Joseph R. Shoenfield
in [3] (p. 332))
6.3 Non-Local Causation of Quantum Algorithms
With the discovery of physical, quantum-theoretical non-locality and quan-
tum entanglement (from EPR paradox,1935, to Bell’s inequalities, 1964, to
Aspect’s experimental confirmation 1982) and its applicability to QIP, non-
local causation of quantum entanglements became the source of dramatic
improvements in the efficiency of algorithmic solutions of some important
problems, such for example, as the factorization of natural numbers [46].
The radical novelty of quantum algorithms is their high intrinsic paral-
lelism, in contradistinction to the extrinsic, limited, ad hoc parallelism of
classical algorithms.
In other words, the parallelism of a particular classical deterministic al-
gorithm (deploying this suggestive foundational analogy, we do not need to
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complicate matters by considering non-deterministic algorithms) could be
achieved only at the second stage of its construction, the first stage being
its strictly sequential conception and realization of all of its steps – bearing
on, mirroring, and mimicking deterministic processes of classical physics. To
this should be added that the functioning of a classical computer executing
such an algorithm could be checked, at least in principle, at any moment and
in any of its physical bits without interrupting its calculations.
As to the functioning of a quantum computer (as yet, at least materially, a
sci-fi dream), it bears on, mirrors, and mimics quantum-theoretical processes,
and any attempt to check the state of one of its qubits would irreparably
corrupt calculations. A quantum algorithm, as its classical companion, is
built in basic sequential stages, or routines, but, in the difference of a classical
algorithm, it does not program the execution of a stage when it represents a
genuine quantum process playing out on a carefully chosen bunch of qubits.
In other words, arriving at such a stage, the algorithm programs the
initial tuple of quantum states of the bunch and directs the “quantum flow ”
of information through a carefully chosen sequence of quantum operators –
exactly in the same way as one might direct the flow of water in an irrigation
system, without being aware of, interested in, and being able to check what
might happen with a particular molecule or bigger portion of water.
At the end of this loosely controlled flow of parallel processes, the algo-
rithm is supposed to check one or more numeric characteristics of some of
the qubits involved (quantum operation of measuring), thus destroying the
ongoing process, but collecting pieces of information which are used either as
a part of the output, or at next quantum stages, or for adjusting the global
strategy, or for a combination of all these purposes.
6.4 Fundamental Object-Subject Duality of Mathemat-
ics. Local Causation Case
It would be fair to acknowledge that, at the present juncture, the prospects
of a radical improvement of the strength, flexibility, universality, and user-
friendliness of algorithmic methods of QIP, not to speak of the challenges
of their hardware realizations, are seriously hampered by the extreme nar-
rowness of the only open today window of genuinely quantum-theoretical
opportunities: the entanglement phenomenon.
The current state of QIP affairs should not prevent us from fully appreci-
ate an epistemic and explanatory potential of the non-locality concept – the
potential unimpeded by the currently perceived limits of quantum algorith-
mic non-locality and bearing on a mysterious duality between non-discrete,
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non-local continuum phenomena in (logically unrestricted) Mathematics and
non-discrete and non-local nature of (proof-theoretically unrestricted) Math-
ematical Reasoning.
In particular, there is no doubt that the Constructivist grievances ex-
pressed above so eloquently by the late Errett Bishop (the epigraph to Chap-
ter 6) have something to do with the exclusively sequential, deterministic,
and local character of mathematical reasoning and verification accepted by
the Constructivist school. – Whereas a “Classical mathematician” permits
himself to freely fly over, or surf along the continuum flow, and to do this
in a “formally irresponsible”, i.e., essentially non-local, non-sequential, and
non-deterministic from the Aristotelian logics point of view, way.
We will approach this hypothetic general duality from below, in three local
causation steps, starting with the most primitive, and yet already very robust
and highly important level of Mathematical Reasoning – Computation, the
Mathematics “that can be carried out by finite beings” (Errett Bishop, cf. the
epigraph above) named robots, or computers.
Thesis 7 First Duality Principle: Finitist Mathematics Abides by
Local Causation.
• Constructivism is the branch of Mathematics with the vocation of de-
signing constructive definitions (of creation) of finite mathematical objects
and of operations on such objects. Constructive methods are finitist, dis-
crete, and of local causation nature.
• Classical Theory of Computing (Turing Machine, Church’s λ−calculus,
etc.) has the vocation of empowering people with formal finite and discrete
computational mechanisms abiding by the condition of local causation, to
manipulate objects of constructive nature using constructive operations.
The next level of our universal duality thesis corresponds more or less to
Errett Bishop’s dream of “man’s mathematics”, alias Stephen G. Simpson’s
aforementioned “countable mathematics” ([55], p. 1).
We speak here about problem solving and proof-theoretic analysis which
could be carried out in subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic Z2 [55] un-
der the umbrella of the Countable Ordinal Analysis which employs Ordinal
Arithmetic on countable ordinals. Ordinal Arithmetic on countable ordinals
has the primary purpose of designing systems of ordinal notations to name
each ordinal in certain initial stretch of the countable ordinals (cf., e.g., [53],
p. 65). According to the above analysis, Section 6.2, Countable Ordinal
Arithmetic is of a demonstratively local causation nature.
Thesis 8 Second Duality Principle: Countable Mathematics Abides
By Local Causation.
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• The objects of Countable Mathematics are number-theoretical, combi-
natorial, and analytic theories constructed from axioms of good-behaving sub-
systems of Second Order Arithmetic, as well propositions, provable in such
theories.
• Proof-theoretic machinery employing Countable Ordinal Analysis has
the vocation of empowering people with means to both analyze the ordinal rank
or complexity of such theories and propositions (properly Ordinal analysis
[48]) and to determine the minimal in its ordinal complexity set of axioms
needed to proof a particular proposition (Reverse Mathematics [53]).
The last locally causal level of our universal duality thesis should cor-
respond to the case of Predicativity. In one of its completely settled in-
terpretations, the predicativity attribute belongs to Countable Mathematics,
being of the Feferman-Schütte ordinal rank Γ0 (called therefore the least non-
predicatively provable countable ordinal), and thus, belongs to our Second
Duality Thesis.
However, taking in account the fact that the intuitive notion of predica-
tivity is far from being settled, persisting to remain informal with Solomon
Ferferman’s last unfolding concept, we will restrict ourselves here to the re-
mark that the very attribute of unfolding ([19], p. 614) perfectly fits in our
interpretation of local causation.
7 Non-Locality of Classical Mathematics Ver-
sus Local Causation of “Man’s Mathematics”
7.1 Making the Case For a Synthesis of the Realist and
Platonic Conceptions of Mathematics
We are prepared now to treat a conception of Mathematics fitting in Georg
Cantor’s original, optimistic epistemic vision, the conception both most gen-
eral from the mathematical practitioner’s point of view and most generous
from the point of view of a logician.
The epistemic framework we adopt here is both Platonic whenever we
deal with the objectivity and striking relevancy – or, in Eugene Paul Wigner’s
words, “the unreasonable effectiveness” [61] – of the flow of the mathematical
knowledge in natural sciences, and Realist whenever we need to treat the
question of the actual existence of mathematical “objects” whose notations
and properties are the real, and only, subjects of any formal mathematical
study.
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In other words, we do not follow the unabashed, extrovert Platonism of
Georg Cantor and, to some degree, of Kurt Gödel so far as, e.g., to recognize
sets as having independent of human definitions existence. And yet, we
do assume that, say, the two millenarian quest for the mystery of the real
continuum has the merit to bring off correct and pithy presentations of some
objectively existing aspects of “the real world”, the aspects which, prior to
any formalization, are the subject of our mathematical intuition.
Still, those will be not these aspects which we are attempting to explicitly
accommodate in our epistemic and formal framework, but the free flow of
mathematically efficacious and formally attractive constructions and theories
inspired by this intuition – and we are intending to carry on this accommoda-
tion without any logical or philosophical preconceptions of the last century’s
metamathematical schools.
We believe that in choosing this middle way between the Scylla of a free
wheeling Idealism and Charybdis of a disciplinarian’s Pragmatism, we remain
faithful to Georg Cantor’s original intuition of Mathematical Infinity, all his
post-factum Platonic justifications notwithstanding.
As, for example, in the following famous, theologically colored remark,
Cantor actually defends not the objective, independent of us existence of
transfinite totalities but the free, unimpeded modus operandi of the Creator
of the Universe – and thus, nolens volens, our own intellectual freedom – to
discover the formal traces of what is captured by Mathematical Infinity and
to treat them where, when, and however it might be worth one’s while:
“I am so in favor of the actual infinite that instead of admitting that
Nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that Nature makes frequent
use of it everywhere, in order to show more effectively the perfections of its
Author.” (As quoted in [14], p. 124.)
7.2 The Object-Subject Duality of Mathematics. Non-
Locality Case: Heuristics
Contrary to the above duality theses, Section 6.4, our choices of “Object”
and “Subject” of Mathematics abiding by non-locality causation cannot be
as specific, and the corresponding non-locality thesis will remain heuristic.
It will be soon clear why it should be so and what it would take to formally
advance our understanding of, and mastering Mathematics free from locality
constrains.
• An Instance of a Mathematical Object Abiding by Non-Local Causation.
To begin with, consider the setting of Zeno’s paradox “Achilles and the Tor-
toise” consisting of two independent, simultaneously unfolding, “objective”
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mathematical processes: the Tortoise’s steady advancement along the real
line R and Achilles ever shortened strides along the same line. Achilles strat-
egy and its realization are familiar to us: they are discrete, recursive, abiding
by local causation.
But what about the Tortoise’s ? Why is Zeno suggesting that hers is a
more enigmatic logical and mathematical enterprise, the enterprise incom-
patible or difficultly compatible with “man’s mathematics” of Errett Bishop ?
– By the way, it is not by chance that Zeno has chosen a man, Achilles, who
has to catch up with a fabulously slow and yet mysteriously unattainable
Tortoise.
The answer, we believe, is that Zeno allots to the Tortoise the “divine
ability” to “calmly swim along the flow” of the continuum, whereas Achilles,
the man, has no choice but to dangerously hang over the bottomless depths
of this primeval continuum stream, being able to advance only by jumping
from a one point-size location on this stream – the location carefully chosen
and temporally frozen solid – to the next one.
In other words, Zeno’s paradox suggests, first, that the real continuum
R – at any given moment of our considerations – “divinely” (taking Errett
Bishop’s at his word) exists in our intuition, simultaneously with all its con-
tinuum points, intervals, etc. – the scenario clearly implying some non-local
causation – and second, that any specific mathematical question implying R
cannot be humanly resolved but within an appropriate discrete, sequential
mathematical framework abiding by a local causation principle.
So much about the aspects of non-local causation in our intuitive percep-
tion of the real continuum.
7.3 Non-Locality. Interpretation & Foundational Impli-
cations I: Logical Paradoxes, Circularity, and Truth
Moreover, we claim that the discovery, by Bertrand Russel and his follow-
ers, of logical paradoxes characterized by self-referentiality, or as it is known
today circularity of formal arguments [21] – such as Russel’s “set of all sets
which are not elements of themselves” or Liar paradoxes [42] – were, and
to some extent, remain just new, surprising, and to the pioneers and early
practitioners of our science, historically painful manifestations of the au-
thenticity and fundamentality of Zeno’s and Everrett Bishop’s predicament:
how to represent an essentially and irremediably non-local “divine” reality by
“man’s” sequential local causality arguments.
Making the Point 6 : Two Types of Logical Paradoxes Reflecting
Two Sources of Uncertainty about the Truth of Mathematical and
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Logical Claims.
(1) Russel’s paradox simulates the unavoidable circularity of some def-
initions of set theory and of the original, full-blown, non-constructive and
non-predicative system of analysis. As Zeno’s paradox, it pushes to its ab-
surd limits a conventional wisdom about the human ability to instantly and
yet correctly appreciate a complex, dynamical, nonlocal by its very nature
reality. Whereas in Zeno’s case Achilles possesses the faculty of an instant
observation of the Tortoise’s position but is artificially deprived of the faculty
of instant prevision concerning her future positions, Russel’s paradox plays in
a similar way with human faculties to be instantly formally correct in a very
selectively, syntactically understood way – but to pitifully fail semantically.
(2) As to Liar paradoxes, from simple to strengthened ones, they play
with the natural languages ability to treat nonlocal reality, nonlocal both tem-
porally – i.e., outside the limits of instantaneousness – and spatially but
also relationally, in a formally ambiguous but perfectly understandable and
workable way.
7.4 Non-Locality. Interpretation & Foundational Im-
plications II: Problem Solving, Theorem Proving,
Theories Building
• Mathematical Subject Abiding by Non-Local Causation. As a matter of
course, similar aspects of non-locality are present in the treatment of all cases
of infinite, or even finite but immensely big mathematical structures. In fact a
good practitioner should always have a global, all-embracing, instantaneous,
non-local in its causation, intuitive grasp of structures of interest to him,
both exemplified and pushed to its limits by Srinivasa Ramanujan’s (1887-
1920) intimate familiarity with numbers ([29], p. 12) and his general way
of doing mathematics – by “showing astonishing imaginative power ”, even
if “as always, proving next to nothing” [29] (p. 15). Two other young and
tragically early departed mathematical geniuses, Niels Henrik Abel (1802-
1829) and Evarist Galois (1811-1832), have left to the posterity not less rich
and original visions of both never before observed mathematical landscapes
and mathematical laws by which these landscapes abide – but not much, or
not at all, traces of deductive rigor and very little, if at all, proofs.
From the epistemic level of Computation, we have already ascended – up
the ladder of epistemic non-triviality and intrinsic conceptual complexity of
mathematical challenges – to Theorem Proving, Axiomatizing, Consistency,
Independency, and Ordinal Strength of axiomatic studies. Doing this, we
were following the metamathematical practices of the 20th century which
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have successfully formalized, customized, and perfected computational and
proof-theoretic methods and skills – always abiding, as it has been demon-
strated above, Chapter 6, by local causation principles.
The next step should dispense us with this fundamental restriction and
to bring first, still tentative, fuzzy, and yet indubitable insights into what
might one day become Mathematics with Non-Local Causation.
There is not much precedents for, and apparently no precursors of such
an enterprise. The following historical remark by Igor R. Shafarevich gives
the closest known to the present author fit for an extrinsic – as antonymous
to intrinsic, in other words, epistemic, i.e., of commanding interest to the
present study – foretaste of the enigma of non-local causation:
“Viewed superficially, Mathematics is the result of centuries of effort by
many thousands of largely unconnected individuals scattered across conti-
nents, centuries and millennia. However, the internal logic of its development
much more resembles the work of a single intellect developing its thought in a
continuous and systematic way, and only using as a means a multiplicity of
human individualities, much as in an orchestra playing a symphony written
by some composer the theme moves from one instrument to another so that
as soon as one performer is forced to cut short his part, it is taken up by
another player, who continues it with due attention to the score.” [51] (p.
182)
Without pretending to fully understand, let alone to endorse the pre-
sumed by the above statement providential character of the progress in
Mathematics driven by apparently unrelated efforts of a dispersed and dis-
connected collectivity of professionals, we choose to apply here Shafarevich’s
noble vision of new, emerging mathematical artifacts and theories to the work
of an individual: as a simultaneous, harmoniously coordinated execution of,
say, a symphony by “a band of players”, i.e., her or his disparate, almost
unrelated, in many cases most illogical insights “playing the whole thing out”
without any restraints of local causation.
Moreover, we see the authentic vocation of Non-Local Causation Mathe-
matics asMetamathematics of Emerging Mathematical Objects, Claims, The-
ories :
Thesis 9 Third Duality Principle: Non-Local Causation in Prob-
lem Solving, Theorem Proving, Theories Building.
With the emergence of non-local causation in the treatment of the afore-
mentioned challenges, we are formally approaching the next level of mathe-
matical reasoning: the emergence, sometimes, simultaneously or in a casual
order, first, of initially only intuitively perceived new mathematical struc-
tures, accompanied by an intuitive conception of eventual claims concerning
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these structures, and followed by an intuitive search for proofs of such claims.
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